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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920484-CA 
v. : 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for issuing a bad 
check, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-505 (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove that 
defendant issued a check knowing that it would not be paid? "In 
considering [whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict, the appellate court] review[s] the evidence and 
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [The appellate court] 
reversefs] a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
2. Does the bad check statute, which makes criminal 
the issuance of a bad check "paying for any services, wages, 
salary, [or] labor" embrace the payment for concrete? 
"Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Utah 
appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of 
error standard, without deference to the trial court." State v. 
Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990) (citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. (1990) 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft - Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the 
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, 
or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is 
refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check 
or draft for which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed 
to know the check or draft would not be paid if he had no account 
with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the 
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, 
or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally refused by 
the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the 
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual 
notice of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be 
punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts 
made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
2 
months amounts to a sum of not more than $200, such offense shall 
be a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn 
in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to 
a sum exceeding $200 but not more than $300, such offense shall 
be a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn 
in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to 
a sum exceeding $300 but not more than $1,000, such offense shall 
be a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn 
in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to 
a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense shall be a second degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, William Christensen, was charged by 
information with the offense of issuing a bad check in an amount 
exceeding $2,000.00, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1990) (R. 1). Following a jury trial, 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to a term of one to fifteen 
years. The sentence was suspended upon defendant's successful 
completion of a thirty-six month probation. Defendant was also 
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,229.74 to the 
victim (R. 82). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June, 1991 defendant was engaged in the construction 
of a cabin in the area of Fairview, Sanpete County (R. 93-94, 
121). On July 1, 1991, defendant and Stephen Ludlow, owner of 
Nephi Lumber ("Nephi"), entered into an agreement in which Nephi 
would provide defendant with concrete for the construction of the 
cabin (R. 94). Because Nephi could not obtain sufficient 
information on which to offer defendant credit, the parties 
agreed that delivery of concrete would be only on a cash basis 
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(R. 94, 127). 
On July 5, 1991, Nephi delivered four truckloads of 
concrete to the jobsite, a distance of forty miles from Nephi's 
plant, requiring a travel time of one and one-quarter to one and 
one half hours (R. 95, 122). Defendant did not pay for the 
concrete, stating that he did not have his checkbook with him (R. 
95). On July 9, defendant called to cancel delivery of more 
concrete, but was too late to prevent the dispatch of one truck, 
which poured its load upon arrival at the jobsite (R. 123, 95-
96). Defendant also did not pay for this delivery, knowing that 
he did not have the cash to pay for it (R. 96, 123, 127). Ludlow 
testified that Nephi would no longer do business with defendant 
until payment was received (R. 97, 101). 
On September 7, 1991, Nephi received a check from 
defendant in the amount of $2229 in full payment of his account 
(R. 97, 129). Following deposit, the check was returned to Nephi 
indicating that there were insufficient funds to cover it (R. 97-
98). Defendant's bank statement indicated that there had not 
been more than $817.38 in the account at any time since July 1, 
and that on September 5, 1991, there was only $45.76 in the 
account (State's Ex. 3, copied at R. 23, 106). As of trial 
defendant had not paid the debt to Nephi (R. 98, 131). 
Defendant testified that he would have been able to pay 
for the concrete from proceeds from the job, but that he was not 
paid (R. 124). He also claimed to have been expecting a direct 
transfer of enough funds to his account to cover his debt to 
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Nephi, which he intended to pay, from an investor in his mining 
operation (R. 126-127). However, the investor, whose name 
defendant, in contempt of court, refused to disclose, did not 
come through, and the funds were never deposited (R. 126, 130). 
Defendant also acknowledged that at the time he wrote the check 
he knew that he did not have sufficient funds to cover it (R. 
127, 129). 
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to 
dismiss on the ground that his check was not issued to induce 
Nephi to part with any money or property or other thing of value, 
nor to pay for any service, wages, salary, labor or rent (R. 
112). The prosecution argued that the sale of concrete was 
different from the sale of other items in that it was perishable, 
and that the delivery of concrete constituted a service under the 
bad check statute (R. 113). Ruling that the evidence indicated 
that concrete was unique in requiring special services for its 
delivery, the trial court found those services to be within the 
purview of the act and denied defendant's motion (115-16).l 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Under section 76-6-505 culpable intent consists only in 
knowing a check will not be paid. In this case there was 
evidence to show that defendant knew that his account did not 
have sufficient funds to cover the $2229 check, that defendant's 
1
 The colloquy and ruling pertaining to defendant's motion 
to dismiss is attached at Addendum A. 
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account had not held more than $817.38 for at least two months 
prior to the issuance of the check and that as of the date of 
trial the debt still had not been paid, all of which was 
sufficient to prove that defendant possessed a culpable state of 
mind. 
POINT II 
The legislative policy behind the bad check statute is 
to make criminal the intentional impeding of commercial 
transactions brought about by the passing of bad checks. In this 
case the legislative policy should be broadly construed to find 
that the provision of concrete was within the statute making 
criminal the "paying for services, wages, salary [or] labor" 
through the issuance of a bad check. There was evidence to show 
that like such "services, wages, salary [or] labor," the 
provision of concrete was a unique service whose performance was, 
in the ordinary course of business contemplated by the statute, 
necessarily tendered before the payment of money and which could 
not be withdrawn as might the provision of other products. 
Given defendant's undisputable culpable state of mind 
in passing the bad check, and given the clear intent of the 
legislature in enacting the bad check statute, defendant's 




DEFENDANT POSSESSED A CULPABLE STATE OF MIND 
UNDER THE BAD CHECK STATUTE BY KNOWINGLY 
ISSUING A CHECK WHICH HE KNEW THE BANK WOULD 
NOT PAY, 
Defendant arguesf in effect, that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that he acted with intent to 
defraud in writing the bad check because he believed that there 
would be funds to cover it from an anonymous mining investor 
(Appellant's Brief at Point II). 
At the outset, defendant misapprehends the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1990), in arguing that he did not 
have an "intent to defraud" Nephi. The phrase, "intent to 
defraud," refers to the intention not to pay in an action for 
fraud or deceit, 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit §§ 36, 185, 188 
(1968), and was the operative phrase in the predecessor statute 
to section 76-6-505.2 In State v. Delmotte, 665 P. 2d 1314 (Utah 
2
 Prior to the revision of the entire criminal code in 
1973, the issuance of bad checks was made criminal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953), which provided, in pertinent part: 
Any person who . . . wilfully, with 
intent to defraud, makes . . . or delivers 
any check . . . upon any bank . . . for the 
payment of money, knowing at the time of such 
making . . . or delivering that the maker 
. . . has not sufficient funds in . . . said 
bank . . . for the payment of such checks 
[sic] . . ., in full upon its presentation, 
although no express representation is made 
with reference thereto, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more 
than one year, or in the state prison for not 
more than 14 years. 
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1983), the court noted such intent was no longer required under 
the present bad check statute: 
Defendant's final contention is that the 
court erred in failing to instruct that 
intent to defraud is a necessary element of a 
bad check charge. This claim of error is 
without merit, since the offense calls for no 
such element. Defendant argues that when the 
statutory language was changed in 1977, the 
legislature intended to retain the element as 
part of the offense. The omission of the 
element in the revised statute logically can 
mean nothing but that the legislature's 
purpose deliberately was to remove such 
intent as an element of the offense. The 
element of 'knowledge' of the overdraft is 
now sufficient to support a conviction. 
Id. at 1315. See State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1983) 
(Hall, C.J., dissenting and distinguishing section 76-6-505 from 
its predecessor, noting that the "gravemen of the offense is the 
issuance of a check 'knowing it will not be paid,'" citing 
Delmotte); State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228, 1231 n.4 (Utah App. 
1989) (citing Delmotte with approval for the proposition that 
"[i]ntent to defraud is not a necessary element of the bad check 
offense under section 76-6-505 as now written"). 
When challenging the jury's verdict, the defendant must 
show that the evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983), M[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable 
The making . . . of such check . . . as 
aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of 
intent to defraud. [Emphasis added.] 
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inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate court] 
will not disturb them." See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985) . 
In State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985), a 
prosecution under section 76-6-505, the court found the jury was 
under no obligation to believe the defendant lacked knowledge of 
the insufficiency of her bank account, despite her 
possibly not having received bank statements for the two months 
preceding her writing bad checks. See also State v. Coffey, 564 
P.2d 777 (Utah 1977) (sufficient evidence to prove that the 
defendant issued a bad check knowing it would not be paid where 
no deposits had been made to cover check and that for almost a 
month afterward there were still insufficient funds in the 
account). 
In thi: case defendant admitted that, notwithstanding 
his expectation that funds would be deposited to his account, he 
knew he did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the 
check written to Nephi (R. 127, 129). Defendant's checking 
account contained only $45.76 two days before the issuance of the 
check, and never had more than $817.38 from July 1, 1991 (State's 
Ex. 3, copied at R. 23, 106). Defendant claimed that he expected 
funds to be directly deposited to his account from a prospective 
investor, but he refused to disclose the name of the investor (R. 
129-130), clearly undercutting the ground of his defense on the 
question of intent. 
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Furthermore, assuming the other requirements of the 
statute are met, section 76-6-505 effectively creates an 
irrebuttable presumption of guilt if a person making a bad check 
"fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount 
of the refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving 
actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (1990). The jury was instructed on this 
requirement under the statute (Jury Instruction #2, R. 51). 
Ludlow testified that after the check was returned, he 
warned defendant that if it were not paid he would turn the 
matter over to the police, which he did on October 17 (R. 97-98). 
The evidence was undisputed that the check had not been paid as 
of the date of trial, June 4, 1992. Thus, more than 14 days 
passed following defendant's actual notice that the check had not 
been paid, during which time the debt remained unpaid. 
In sum, the evidence was not so inconclusive or 
improbable that the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the offense charged. 
POINT II 
THE POLICY BEHIND SECTION 76-6-505, TO PUNISH 
A CRIMINAL INTENT TO IMPEDE THE FLOW OF 
COMMERCE THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF BAD CHECKS, 
REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT BE FOUND 
CRIMINAL. 
A. Criminal Culpability is Not 
Precluded in this Case in Spite 
of the Bad Check's Being Given 
to Satisfy an Antecedent Debt. 
Defendant argues that because the check was given to 
satisfy a past due account it could not have induced the delivery 
10 
of the concrete, and is therefore not actionable under section 
76-6-505, citing State v. Green, in support (Appellant's Brief at 
Point III). 
The State concedes that if defendant's conduct is 
subject only to that portion of the statute that makes criminal 
the passing of a bad check "for the purpose of obtaining from any 
. . . firm, partnership or corporation, any money, property, or 
other thing of value . . •," then his passing of a bad check is 
not a criminal act: 
Where the worthless check statute 
requires that the cr^ender obtain money or 
property before the .rime is complete, it is 
essential that the party whose money or 
property is obtained believed that the check 
was good and that it would paid, and that in 
thus relying on the check such party was 
induced to transfer the money or property for 
the check. 
32 AM. JUR. 2D False Pretenses § 81 (1982). Accord People v. 
Miller, 286 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); State v. 
Campbell, 543 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Id. 1975). 
This general principle is apparently the op... ative law 
in Utah. See Green, 672 P.2d at 401 (holding that where the 
victim was not induced by a bad check to part with "any money, 
property or thing of value . . ., [a]n essential element of the 
crime was missing"). 
Contrariwise, 
where the statute is drawn so that it is not 
essential that money or property be obtained, 
it would appear that the offense may be 
committed even though the payee takes the 
check in payment of a pre-existing debt, and 
11 
is therefore not relying on the worthless 
check to his disadvantage or detriment. 
32 AM. JUR. 2D False Pretenses § 81 (1982). 
Section 76-6-505 contains an alternative provision, 
making criminal through the issuance of a bad check the "paying 
for any services, wages, salary [or] labor . . . ." This portion 
of the statute does not require that the "thing of value" be 
obtained because of the contemporaneous tender of the bad check, 
but rather in that class of situations in which performance is 
naturally tendered long before payment is offered. Accord Bailey 
v. State, 408 P.2d 244, 244 (Wyo. 1965) (finding actionable the 
issuance of a bad check to pay a past-due indebtedness where the 
statute made criminal not only the obtaining of money, 
merchandise, property or other thing of value through fraud, but 
also "the payment of any obligation" with knowledge of 
insufficient funds). Thus, section 76-6-505 does not preclude 
guilt in all cases in which a bad check is given in satisfaction 
of an antecedent debt. 
B. The Legislative Policy Behind the 
Bad Check Statute/ to Make Criminal 
the Intent to Wrongfully Impede the 
Flow of Commercef Should Govern 
Review in this Case. 
Defendant particularly argues that the delivery of 
concrete is not a "service" under section 76-6-505 (Appellant's 
Brief at Point I). 
"Statutory terms should be interpreted and applied 
according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary 
12 
meaning of the term results in an application that is . . . 'in 
blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'. . 
'[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to 
analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective/ and 
to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and 
purpose.'" State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) (holding that where the 
offense of "furnishing or supplying" alcohol to a minor did not, 
on its face, explicate the degree of control the offender was 
required to exercise in providing alcohol, it was, in part, 
appropriate to consider the protective policy behind the statute 
to protect minors). 
Utah's penal statutes should be broadly construed 
"according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice 
and to effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of 
Section 76-1-104." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990). In State 
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), the court broadly 
construed the criminal simulation statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-518 (1990), to include baseball mitts within its terms in 
the face of the defendant's claim that the statute failed to 
specify the type of goods in question and that similar criminal 
simulation statutes had been interpreted narrowly as covering 
only unique chattels, such as antiques or paintings. Quoting 
from a similar case in New York, the court rejected the 
defendant's argument, adopting the Model Penal Code's view that 
13 
its fraudulent simulation section embraced objects other than 
unique chattels. Id. at 192. In State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 
(Utah 1989), the court considered whether the receiving stolen 
property statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990), embraced 
property that was not actually stolen. Relying on the Model 
Penal Code (as well as other authorities), the court determined 
that property received by an accused need not be stolen in order 
to criminalize otherwise culpable conduct. JTd. at 1170-1173. 
The manner in which the court developed the rationale for its 
decision, whereby conceivably non-culpable conduct was found to 
be within the 
statute's purview, is instructive in this case: 
Modern criminal jurisprudence has a very 
clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent 
instead of simply punishing the manifest 
criminality or outwardly criminal act. Our 
Legislature has expressed that its concern is 
directed more toward subjective criminality 
than toward manifest criminality by stating 
in [Utah Code Ann.] § 76-1-104(2) [(1953, as 
amended)]: 
The Provisions of this code shall be 
construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
. . . . 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and 
mental state which constitute each offense 
and safeguard conduct that is without 
fault from condemnation as criminal. 
. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) Section 76-2-101 expresses 
the same legislative purpose: 
No person is guilty of an offense unless 
his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence with 
respect to each element of the offense as the 
definition of the offense requires; 
14 
• • • 
See State v. Elton, Utah, 680 P.2d 727 
(1984). Sections 76-1-104 and 76-2-101 
demonstrate a legislative desire not to 
punish manifestly criminal acts that are not 
a::~mpanied by a subjective mental state to 
do ,*rong. The converse is also true. We see 
th' legislaturefs desire to punish subjective 
jc: .nalitv so long as it is linked with some 
91 ~wise harmless corroborative act that 
d€ strates the firmness of the actor's 
ci ~nal resolve. Examples of this are [Urah 
Cc Ann.] § 76-4-101(3)(b) [(1953, as 
ar ded)], which denies an impossibility 
de nse to an attempt charge, and [Utah Code 
An ] § 76-2-304(1) [(1953, as amended)], 
wh. ft states that a mistake of fact is a 
defense only if it disproves the culpable 
mental state. Likewise, in the theft by 
receiving statute the Legislature expressed 
its desire to prohibit subjective criminality 
(the culpable mental state of desiring to 
receive stolen property) when it is 
accompanied by an otherwise harmless act 
(receiving property that is not actually 
stolen). The interpretation that the subject 
property need not be stolen and that the 
focus is on the actor's mental state is in 
harmony with the modern trend of criminal 
jurisprudence. See generally G. Fletcher, 
Rethinking Criminal Law ch. 3 (1978). 
Id. at 1172 (emphasis added). 
In State v. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1953), the court found that although prior case law and the 
majority view held the passing of a postdated, insufficient funds 
check would not support a charge of fraud, where evidence 
nonetheless showed an intent to defraud (required under the 
former bad check statute, section 76-20-11), the case should go 
to the jury. The court bolstered its opinion by citing the 
purpose for which the statute was enacted, i.e., the elimination 
of the annoyance of bad check transactions which "disarrange[] 
15 
and retarcl[] the business affairs of every person and institution 
through whose hands such [] check[s] pass[] . . . . This purpose 
should not be defeated by an interpretation of the statute which 
would permit one bent upon fraud to protect himself . . . ." 1 
Utah 2d at 140, 262 P.2d at 963 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). See also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 224.5 comment 
at 315-16 (Official Draft 1985) (noting the adverse impact on 
ordinary commerce resulting from the passing of bad checks even 
where fraudulent purpose is absent). 
Section 76-6-505 clearly distinguishes "paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor or rent" from "payment . . . for 
the purpose of obtaining . . . money, property or anthing of 
value." The apparent reason for this distinction is the former 
class, in the ordinary course of business, are paid for only 
after the cheated party has tendered his consideration and, 
naturally, cannot be withheld if payment is not contemporaneously 
forthcoming. In this respect the provision of concrete, which in 
most contexts would simply be regarded as a product, is most like 
service, wage, salary, labor or rent. Ludlow testified that once 
the concrete was on its way to a destination as distant as 
defendant's jobsite, it could not be returned under any 
circumstance and still retain its value (R. 96-97). 
Additionally, Ludlow stated that imbedded in the cost of concrete 
were the wages and labor of his employees (R. 100-01). 
In this case defendant indisputedly knew that he did 
not have sufficient funds to cover the check he had issued to 
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Nephi. The purpose of the statute is to make criminal the 
passing of bad checks which impede the flow of commerce. 
Furthermore, the statute reaches a certain class of items, whose 
common feature is that they cannot be withheld by the provider 
once they are tendered, a condition which pertains in this case, 
regardless of when the check is passed. For all of these reasons 
this Court should find that defendant's issuance of a bad check 
in this case is within the purview of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and his 
conviction. yrr 
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think that our argument is and we would move the Court 
to dismiss the case at this time based on the evidence 
that's been presented because it is our feeling that 
the State has not met the requirement of the statute, 
and that is that the statute says if the check — 
THE COURT: Which section — 
MR. HARMON: I'm referring to Section 
76-6-505. 
THE COURT: Give me one second. 
MR. HARMON: It's on page 110. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HARMON: What we're saying is that 
there's no question that the check was not issued to 
cause Nephi Lumber to part with any money or property 
or other thing of value. That had already been parted 
with. And I think that the statute as to those things 
would say if the charge is good, then the check must 
have been the inducement to cause the parting of those 
items. 
I'm not sure how that applies with the other 
things, but it says, "if the check is issued for the 
paying of any service, wages, salary, labor, or rent." 
And in this case there's no question that the check 
was not issued for any of those things. It was issued 
for an open account that arose by reason of the sale 
of concrete. And concrete is a product and doesn't 
fall within any of the prescriptions provided by the 
statute. So I think that it's clear that 
Mr. Christensen has issued a check to pay an 
outstanding account. The account was several months 
old by the time the check was issued; and, therefore, 
the criminal charge should be dismissed. 
Clearly, he owes the debt and there are other 
provisions in the Code on how that can be collected. 
But I don't think the criminal process is the 
appropriate proceeding at the present time, and we 
would ask that the case be dismissed. 
MR. EYRE: Your Honor, as you've determined 
from the testimony, the sale of concrete is different 
from the sale of other items. It's clearly a 
perishable item. The practice in the industry is if 
it's going to be a cash sale, that the payment is made 
upon delivery of the concrete. 
I think this is very much similar to the 
other things that are talked about there, services, 
wages, labor, or rent. Those are items that payment 
is made after the service is rendered, the rent is 
incurred. It talks about services there. This is the 
service of delivery of concrete, and the payment is 
received thereafter. 
Mr. Ludlow has clearly testified that he 
would not have delivered the concrete on a credit 
basis. It was clearly on the basis that he was going 
to be paid cash or check in lieu of cash. 
I think that it falls within the language of 
the statute, the prima facie case that's been 
submitted based upon the State's case in chief. 
If the Court finds not, I think that the Code 
of Criminal Procedure clearly permits that if one 
crime has not been committed based upon the evidence 
but that clearly another crime has, and that being 
theft by deception, then the Court is in a position to 
amend the Information to charge the alternate offense 
of theft by deception. 
Clearly, Mr. Christensen if he didn't issue a 
bad check for the payment of services, he induce the 
delivery of the concrete, the permanent deprivation of 
that property of Mr. Ludlow's, by deception, by 
misrepresentation. 
But I still feel that based upon the language 
of the statute, that the evidence that has been 
submitted comes within the realm of that statute. And 
the State has made a prima facie case, and the case 
should go forward. 
MR. HARMON: I just have one short comment, 
Vonda K. Bassett, CSR (801) 429-1080 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. HARMON: I think that the concern we have 
here is that Mr. Ludlow was clearly well-trained in 
his business. He knows what the situation is with 
concrete. And I think that he knew that as soon as he 
loaded those trucks in Nephi and headed them down the 
road to Sanpete County that if he was not going to 
receive payment, he in effect had extended credit. 
The only alternative he's telling us that he 
has is when he gets there if there's no payment to be 
received, he can just waste his concrete. 
In this case he delivered one load, and then 
several days later he delivers another load. And he 
never has been paid for these. I think if this were a 
true inducement, if the check had been delivered prior 
to the loads going over or at the time it was received 
by them, then I think we have a case. But here the 
check was never involved in any of that. 
THE COURT: The problem — and I agree if 
we're talking totally about a product, but I think 
that there is more than the purchase or promise of 
payment or purchase for a product. 
And I agree with Mr. Eyre that concrete has 
some unique qualities in the aspect that it requires 
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special equipment for delivery and special handling by 
people for delivery, and literally for its delivery 
not only to a project site, but to the specific area 
where it's going to be used and formed. There is a 
definite service provided in connection with that. 
The service not only being driving a truck over, but 
then discharging the product from the truck into forms 
provided by the contractor on the site. And that's an 
additional service that comes with it. 
It isn't like going to the lumber yard and 
picking up a load of 2 X 4's that you can either have 
delivered or pick up yourself. You don't go pick up a 
load of concrete in the back of your truck. It 
requires those additional items of service. And I 
think those services are within the intent of the 
legislature, and the Court would so order. Anything 
else on that? 
MR. HARMON: That's all we have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well, then. The motion will 
be denied. 
And if you'll bring the jury back. 
(The proceedings were resumed in open court 
in the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Well, it looks like the sheriff 
was successful in finding all of you. That's good. 
